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Securing the access in networks is a first-order concern 
that only gains importance with the advent of Internet 
of Things (IoT).  In this paper, a security system is pre-
sented for password-free access over the secured link. 
It makes the connection faster than manual authenti-
cation and facilitates Machine-to-Machine (M2M) se-
cure interactions, as required for IoT. The authentica-
tion procedure includes the exchange of certificate and 
challenge/response pairs, which are stored and com-
puted in an external security coprocessor. The system 
enforces the authentication protocol, includes error 
detection, and handles multiple devices according to 
their Operating Systems (OS) through their connec-
tions/disconnections. It also performs encryption, if 
necessary. It is applicable on application level for de-
vices, including IoT based devices, sensors, Android, 
and iOS-based smartphones. The devices that have the 
correct certificate and can solve the challenge can con-
nect to the network linked with the security system. 
The system security is hardened because the sensitive 
authentication elements such as keys, certificates, and 
challenge responses are invisible to users and are ex-
changed only using strong hashing algorithms that are 
irreversible. The proposed hardware security system 
can augment any supporting network, converting the 
entire insecure network into a secured one, as well as 
retrofit existing insecure Bluetooth devices for secure 
access. The system incurs low overhead in time and 
energy by performing security operations in an ASIC 
coprocessor, and can be shared to secure access to 
multiple devices, which reduces both energy and cost.
ACM CCS (2012) Classification: Security and priva-
cy → Security in hardware → Embedded systems 
security
Computer systems organization → Embedded and cy-
ber-physical systems → Sensor networks
Keywords: multiplatform, secure channel, IoT, wire-
less, multiple devices, Bluetooth
1. Introduction
In 2020, billions of Internet of Thing (IoT) de-
vices will be available [1], turning this world 
into a hub of wireless networks consisting of 
"things" such as sensors, home appliances, and 
computing devices. In turn, security becomes 
an important factor, as any such thing becomes 
accessible and vulnerable to attacks.
The existing methods, such as authentication by 
passwords can mitigate the issues only partial-
ly. The passwords can be cracked through com-
putation and by means of deceiving the users. 
Passwords are also tedious as they must be re-
membered and entered by users, making them 
time-consuming in most cases. More impor-
tantly, the IoT world is becoming essentially a 
Machine-to-Machine (M2M) domain, in which 
intervention by humans is prohibitively expen-
sive, if not impossible.
In certain critical cases, additional devices can 
produce authentication tokens, often in a way 
applicable to the specific authentication scenar-
io. In the past decade, two-factor authentication 
systems have been introduced. They employ an 
additional personal device [2], such as a phone 
or a tablet, to produce an authentication token. 
The scheme is fairly simple to use; howev-
er, it also comes with disadvantages. The use 
of passwords is still one of the problems, and 
the time it takes to authenticate becomes worse 
than when using the passwords alone.
To address these issues, a hardware-based se-
curity system that can authenticate and encrypt 
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the communication between multiple devices 
or between devices and peripherals is proposed. 
The proposed system performs password-free 
authentication, which increases the authenti-
cation speed and eliminates human errors. It 
is compatible across different computing plat-
forms and is capable of securing peripherals 
such as sensors that are either wireless or wired. 
Similar to two-factor authentication, there are 
two steps to execute. With the system, a proto-
col was designed that allows the authentication 
for accessing multiple devices and encrypting 
the raw data of peripherals or sensors, in a way 
compatible with connection-oriented or con-
nectionless communications. Hence the chan-
nel between user devices and security system 
is authenticated and encrypted. The details of 
packet formation, handling the timeout, ac-
knowledgments, sequences, size, payloads, and 
checksums, are all carefully addressed in the 
proposed solution as well.
The hardware-based security system is de-
signed and deployed for both leading smart-
phone platforms that can perform authentication 
compatible with an X.509v3 certificate-based 
authentication, and a challenge-response ex-
change based on hash-based message authenti-
cation code (HMAC) ‒ Secure Hash Algorithm 
(SHA256) was used as the underlying hashing 
algorithm, which is deemed secure for the time 
being [3]. For encryption, an Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography (ECC) is used, with dynamically 
generated asymmetric keys used to establish a 
secure connection. Using this connection, the 
system exchanges a shared key used to perform 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryp-
tion, as specified by the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST).
The remainder of this paper is outlined as fol-
lows. Section 2 presents the previous related 
work on hardware-based security, as well as 
authentication and encryption of IoT based sys-
tems. In Section 3, the proposed system archi-
tecture and design, as well as the parts that it is 
composed of, can be found, whereas in Section 
4 the core of the system, a coprocessor, is out-
lined. System advantages and applications are 
given in Section 5. The implementation and 
evaluation of the security system can be seen in 
Section 6. The last section concludes the paper 
and discusses any potential future work for the 
system.
2. Related Work
Wireless sensor networks (WSN) for IoT require 
strong cryptography to protect data from the at-
tacks in which intruders could be anywhere in 
the world. The most common methods of pro-
tection will be outlined here. The Two-factor au-
thentication system developed by Das [4] needs 
the user to login during the Registration phase, 
followed by Authentication phase that employs 
most commonly another consumer electronic 
device. The Controller-based security includes 
a security manager, a link and network layer se-
curity – there is additional need for the security 
at application layer. TinyPK, an authentication 
protocol based on RSA and Diffie-Hellman al-
gorithms was proposed by Watro et al. [5]. The 
credentials are stored in the device, therefore 
they can be extracted using a stolen verifier at-
tack. The use of user login exposes the keys as 
well as makes it vulnerable to the man-in-the-
middle (MITM) attack, and significantly slows 
down the authentication procedure. A protocol 
was proposed by Shi et al. [6] for WSNs that 
uses elliptic curve cryptography for providing 
a secure communication between sensor de-
vices and user devices. The solution presented 
by Salman et al. in [7] uses the Montgomery 
multiplier hardware and pairing software which 
requires additional computation and power for 
pairing-based cryptography.
Gao and Gang [8] used fingerprinting, digital 
watermarking along with device authentica-
tion, and encryption, which increases the secu-
rity using hardware, but at the same time needs 
additional (e.g., biometric) hardware devices. 
Another approach by Lesjak et al. in [9] used 
hardware-rooted snapshots for transparent and 
secure communication for Industrial IoT. It 
uses schemes such as Broker-based messaging 
infrastructure and hybrid encryption.
The security attacks can take many forms, such 
as physical, side-channel, network, or software 
attacks. Certain security frameworks were built 
to provide security against some of such attacks 
[10]. Wireless systems have been more vulner-
able as the secret encryption key can be extract-
ed from the packets through statistical analysis. 
By using attack methods such as side-channel 
attacks, various approaches were made by Zhen 
et al. [11]. Blockchain-based frameworks were 
also proposed that provide a decentralized se-
curity system having additional features, such 
smith's factorization was discovered by a re-
search team, which allows attackers to compute 
a private key from a public key in a realistic 
amount of time [16], [17], [18]. For reference, a 
512 bit key generated with a low entropy prime 
can be factorized in less than two CPU hours, 
whereas a 1024 bit key can take less than 100 
CPU days, both very feasible with rented cloud 
CPU instances, whereas a 2048 bit key could 
take just over 140 CPU years, a rather large but 
still not infeasible requirement [18].
USB Type-C supports authentication through 
the C-AUTH specification. C-AUTH is an 
authentication specification standard that pro-
vides one-way authentication to authenticate 
USB devices, power supplies, and cables. Au-
thentication is performed with the use of the 
certificates which are signed using private keys 
and hashed for means of verifying them by the 
authenticating party. The cryptographic meth-
ods used are widely available, such as X.509v3 
certificate format and SHA256 hashing algo-
rithm. Certificate chains may be used if needed, 
such as a device certificate that is being signed 
by the manufacturer, who relies on a root cer-
tificate signed by a trusted certificate authority 
[19]. C-AUTH allows only a single device au-
thentication at a time.
In the Web software world, the W3C con-
sortium is introducing a Web Authentication 
(WebAuthn) API, which is an add-on for web 
browsers to generate public key-based creden-
tials which can be accessed by only the origin 
of key [20]. The WebAuthn performs signature 
and attestation of a key with the relying party. 
These are the two steps followed:
(i) registration, in which the authenticator 
generates the key using its user account 
and associates with the reply party, and
(ii) authentication, in which the key is offered 
by the replying party to the authenticator.
The device is registered by signing in an ac-
count or creating a new one in a website opened 
in the browser; the user can add login methods 
such as passwords/PINs or biometric. The Web-
Authn can establish a connection between web 
browser and server systems, but the connection 
between sensor and user device has not been 
explored. Furthermore, the WebAuthn needs 
a browser whereas IoT based systems usually 
interface at lower protocol layers, the authen-
tication system should be able to run over the 
as fault tolerance and scalability by Varshney 
et al. [12].
The YubiKey commercial product implements 
"Security keys" as a second factor device to 
protect the user from MITM, or phishing, at-
tacks [13]. The device acts as a hardware-based 
login system that has been deployed by Google, 
Dropbox and many more. It follows the Uni-
versal Second Factor (U2F) open standard for 
the Security key protocol, which uses key pairs 
explicitly tied to systems in order to authenti-
cate. YubiKey also supports simple passwords 
to automate input, and one-time challenge or 
time-based responses. Once registered and 
configured for two-factor authentication, the 
YubiKey is inserted into USB and a button on 
the key is pressed, or it is simply tapped against 
Near-field communication (NFC) enabled An-
droid smartphones to perform authentication. 
In the software, the YubiKey first registers in 
which a pair of Security keys is generated, and 
public key is returned which is now linked to 
user account. There is also a key handle, which 
ties the key to a specific origin, for example a 
server. When authenticating, the key will match 
the key handle to the correct pair of keys, and 
send a signature created using the private key, 
which is verified by the server to authenticate 
the user [14].
However, the YubiKey is limited to only one 
type of interface, a USB connector, with NFC 
also supported in one model. Moreover, Yu-
biKey can perform authentication on only a sin-
gle device at any given moment, with physical 
action required to authenticate a different de-
vice (that is, connecting it to the other device). 
Further, the YubiKey does not support securing 
the other concurrently used devices and periph-
erals, such as sensors. It requires a fully func-
tional system in place that both supports U2F 
and features device logic that can handle data 
formatting and communication. Last but not 
least, even though YubiKey initially featured 
open-source components, it has transitioned 
to closed-source in the latest models, which 
cannot be reviewed independently for security 
vulnerabilities [15]. This approach that reintro-
duces the 'security through obscurity' concept 
eventually led to a flaw in the underlying cryp-
tographic library, which generated primes with 
low entropy. A practical factorization attack 
(ROCA vulnerability, which stands for Return 
Of Coppersmith Attack), based on Copper-
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the communication between multiple devices 
or between devices and peripherals is proposed. 
The proposed system performs password-free 
authentication, which increases the authenti-
cation speed and eliminates human errors. It 
is compatible across different computing plat-
forms and is capable of securing peripherals 
such as sensors that are either wireless or wired. 
Similar to two-factor authentication, there are 
two steps to execute. With the system, a proto-
col was designed that allows the authentication 
for accessing multiple devices and encrypting 
the raw data of peripherals or sensors, in a way 
compatible with connection-oriented or con-
nectionless communications. Hence the chan-
nel between user devices and security system 
is authenticated and encrypted. The details of 
packet formation, handling the timeout, ac-
knowledgments, sequences, size, payloads, and 
checksums, are all carefully addressed in the 
proposed solution as well.
The hardware-based security system is de-
signed and deployed for both leading smart-
phone platforms that can perform authentication 
compatible with an X.509v3 certificate-based 
authentication, and a challenge-response ex-
change based on hash-based message authenti-
cation code (HMAC) ‒ Secure Hash Algorithm 
(SHA256) was used as the underlying hashing 
algorithm, which is deemed secure for the time 
being [3]. For encryption, an Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography (ECC) is used, with dynamically 
generated asymmetric keys used to establish a 
secure connection. Using this connection, the 
system exchanges a shared key used to perform 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryp-
tion, as specified by the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST).
The remainder of this paper is outlined as fol-
lows. Section 2 presents the previous related 
work on hardware-based security, as well as 
authentication and encryption of IoT based sys-
tems. In Section 3, the proposed system archi-
tecture and design, as well as the parts that it is 
composed of, can be found, whereas in Section 
4 the core of the system, a coprocessor, is out-
lined. System advantages and applications are 
given in Section 5. The implementation and 
evaluation of the security system can be seen in 
Section 6. The last section concludes the paper 
and discusses any potential future work for the 
system.
2. Related Work
Wireless sensor networks (WSN) for IoT require 
strong cryptography to protect data from the at-
tacks in which intruders could be anywhere in 
the world. The most common methods of pro-
tection will be outlined here. The Two-factor au-
thentication system developed by Das [4] needs 
the user to login during the Registration phase, 
followed by Authentication phase that employs 
most commonly another consumer electronic 
device. The Controller-based security includes 
a security manager, a link and network layer se-
curity – there is additional need for the security 
at application layer. TinyPK, an authentication 
protocol based on RSA and Diffie-Hellman al-
gorithms was proposed by Watro et al. [5]. The 
credentials are stored in the device, therefore 
they can be extracted using a stolen verifier at-
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well as makes it vulnerable to the man-in-the-
middle (MITM) attack, and significantly slows 
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vices and user devices. The solution presented 
by Salman et al. in [7] uses the Montgomery 
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rity using hardware, but at the same time needs 
additional (e.g., biometric) hardware devices. 
Another approach by Lesjak et al. in [9] used 
hardware-rooted snapshots for transparent and 
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The security attacks can take many forms, such 
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By using attack methods such as side-channel 
attacks, various approaches were made by Zhen 
et al. [11]. Blockchain-based frameworks were 
also proposed that provide a decentralized se-
curity system having additional features, such 
smith's factorization was discovered by a re-
search team, which allows attackers to compute 
a private key from a public key in a realistic 
amount of time [16], [17], [18]. For reference, a 
512 bit key generated with a low entropy prime 
can be factorized in less than two CPU hours, 
whereas a 1024 bit key can take less than 100 
CPU days, both very feasible with rented cloud 
CPU instances, whereas a 2048 bit key could 
take just over 140 CPU years, a rather large but 
still not infeasible requirement [18].
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vides one-way authentication to authenticate 
USB devices, power supplies, and cables. Au-
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certificates which are signed using private keys 
and hashed for means of verifying them by the 
authenticating party. The cryptographic meth-
ods used are widely available, such as X.509v3 
certificate format and SHA256 hashing algo-
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such as a device certificate that is being signed 
by the manufacturer, who relies on a root cer-
tificate signed by a trusted certificate authority 
[19]. C-AUTH allows only a single device au-
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In the Web software world, the W3C con-
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(WebAuthn) API, which is an add-on for web 
browsers to generate public key-based creden-
tials which can be accessed by only the origin 
of key [20]. The WebAuthn performs signature 
and attestation of a key with the relying party. 
These are the two steps followed:
(i) registration, in which the authenticator 
generates the key using its user account 
and associates with the reply party, and
(ii) authentication, in which the key is offered 
by the replying party to the authenticator.
The device is registered by signing in an ac-
count or creating a new one in a website opened 
in the browser; the user can add login methods 
such as passwords/PINs or biometric. The Web-
Authn can establish a connection between web 
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between sensor and user device has not been 
explored. Furthermore, the WebAuthn needs 
a browser whereas IoT based systems usually 
interface at lower protocol layers, the authen-
tication system should be able to run over the 
as fault tolerance and scalability by Varshney 
et al. [12].
The YubiKey commercial product implements 
"Security keys" as a second factor device to 
protect the user from MITM, or phishing, at-
tacks [13]. The device acts as a hardware-based 
login system that has been deployed by Google, 
Dropbox and many more. It follows the Uni-
versal Second Factor (U2F) open standard for 
the Security key protocol, which uses key pairs 
explicitly tied to systems in order to authenti-
cate. YubiKey also supports simple passwords 
to automate input, and one-time challenge or 
time-based responses. Once registered and 
configured for two-factor authentication, the 
YubiKey is inserted into USB and a button on 
the key is pressed, or it is simply tapped against 
Near-field communication (NFC) enabled An-
droid smartphones to perform authentication. 
In the software, the YubiKey first registers in 
which a pair of Security keys is generated, and 
public key is returned which is now linked to 
user account. There is also a key handle, which 
ties the key to a specific origin, for example a 
server. When authenticating, the key will match 
the key handle to the correct pair of keys, and 
send a signature created using the private key, 
which is verified by the server to authenticate 
the user [14].
However, the YubiKey is limited to only one 
type of interface, a USB connector, with NFC 
also supported in one model. Moreover, Yu-
biKey can perform authentication on only a sin-
gle device at any given moment, with physical 
action required to authenticate a different de-
vice (that is, connecting it to the other device). 
Further, the YubiKey does not support securing 
the other concurrently used devices and periph-
erals, such as sensors. It requires a fully func-
tional system in place that both supports U2F 
and features device logic that can handle data 
formatting and communication. Last but not 
least, even though YubiKey initially featured 
open-source components, it has transitioned 
to closed-source in the latest models, which 
cannot be reviewed independently for security 
vulnerabilities [15]. This approach that reintro-
duces the 'security through obscurity' concept 
eventually led to a flaw in the underlying cryp-
tographic library, which generated primes with 
low entropy. A practical factorization attack 
(ROCA vulnerability, which stands for Return 
Of Coppersmith Attack), based on Copper-
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firmware. The proposed system allows in the 
core of the sensor interfacing hence, the data 
along the processing pathway can be kept more 
secure. Further, the authentication system is in 
the firmware of the control module, making it 
invisible or inaccessible to user.
The security systems studied and reviewed 
above require human intervention or are lim-
ited to a particular network, either Internet or 
WSN. The IoT not only connects computers but 
also connects smartphones with peripherals or 
sensors. The system should be capable of se-
curing any kind of platform such as Android, 
iOS, Windows; therefore, it has to be above the 
OS, at the application layer, while at the same 
time the authentication procedure should be au-
tomatic. If no human intervention is required, 
then the process is invisible and fast, which pro-
tects the system from several types of attacks. It 
should have a low overhead, as well as it should 
work with low-powered devices.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no oth-
er hardware system providing simultaneous 
multi-point security between a wide range of 
devices and technologies, and without human 
input. YubiKey for instance offers some vari-
ety in technologies (USB, NFC), however it is 
point to point and requires human input [14]. 
C-AUTH on the other hand is more automated 
and supports M2M, however it is exclusive to 
USB-C and also point to point [19]. Our pro-
posed system can act between multiple devices, 
including connectivity with sensor nodes that 
often appear in IoT. The presented system per-
forms the authentication, controls the connec-
tivity, and builds an IoT based secured network, 
surpassing the existing systems that deal with 
only one device.
3. System Architecture
In this section, the system architecture of a de-
vice designed to facilitate secure connection of 
multiple types of devices in IoT setups is de-
scribed.
3.1. System overview
The proposed security system is composed of 
several modules. The main part is the security 
coprocessor module, which is a "coprocessor", 
that offers authentication and encryption. The 
system is also composed of a communication 
module, which enables the different systems 
to communicate with each other, while it fol-
lows the defined protocol. In addition, there is 
a control module that controls all modules and 
enables the system to function. It is responsible 
for the information exchanged, the protocol be-
ing followed, and performs authentication and 
encryption as required, by controlling the co-
processor.
Finally, a dedicated application is installed on 
the user device based on the platform such as 
iOS, Android or Windows. It performs the pro-
tocol specific steps with the security system. 
Figure 1 presents the architecture of the system.
For the purpose of clarifying, the practical im-
plementation of the system comprises the con-
trol module that is a microcontroller, the securi-
ty coprocessor module is simply a coprocessor, 
peripherals are devices whose data is to be se-
cured connected to microcontroller via I2C & 
UART such as sensors, and the communication 
module is Bluegiga Bluetooth chip. USB based 
user systems are wired user devices and wire-
less devices are the user smartphones including 
wireless sensors. For consistency purposes, the 
modules will be referred to with their specific 
names rather than the abstracted module names, 
unless necessary. The entire arrangement is 
termed as a security system that can connect to 
any device, node, or peripheral that needs data 
authentication and encryption features. It can 
be used in several use cases and configurations, 
such as authenticating peripherals for devices, 
devices for devices, or even devices for differ-
ent systems, on either one or both ends. If the 
system authenticating another system is trusted, 
then it may not be necessary to authenticate on 
both ends. In any case, an end to end encryption 
will be performed if necessary.
3.2. Coprocessor Module
The coprocessor found in the system can au-
thenticate and encrypt communications [21]. 
The authentication is performed in two steps. 
First, an X.509v3 certificate is sent to the au-
thenticating device from the coprocessor. The 
authenticating device can verify the certificate 
owner by checking the certificate, and verifying 
that the signer of the certificate is an entity that 
is trusted by both. This concludes the first step.
For the second step of the authentication, a ran-
domly generated challenge is submitted by the 
authenticating device. The challenge, together 
with a secret key known to both parties, under-
goes a hash-based message authentication code 
(HMAC) procedure, based on the SHA256 
hashing algorithm, which produces an irrevers-
ible response.
The combination of these two steps ensures the 
device or peripheral is secure and can be trust-
ed, as successful authentication may only be 
performed by the genuine device or peripheral 
that is connected through the security system. 
Following authentication, if the information ex-
changed between devices and peripherals needs 
to remain private, the coprocessor can addition-
ally encrypt it.
3.3. Communication Module
The communication module in the system can 
support various wired interfaces, e.g., Universal 
Serial Bus (USB) or Universal Asynchronous 
Receiver-Transmitter (UART), and wireless 
links, such as Bluetooth, between wireless de-
vices and control module. The communication 
module includes any hardware that is necessary 
for the communications, such as UART con-
trollers or Bluetooth radios, and extends into 
the control module. For the purpose of evalua-
tion, a wireless device with Bluetooth function-
ality (Bluegiga) was used in conjunction with 
the UART interface in the microcontroller. Typ-
ically, the security system will connect to one or 
more devices wirelessly and, on the other side, 
it connects with peripherals or sensors and for-
wards traffic between each other, by forming 
packets for the defined protocol, and does all 
the authentication and encryption.
The defined protocol mandates that commu-
nication may take place over any existing link 
that can send data in a raw form, be it in one or 
multiple packets, as long as all the data is pre-
served and reaches the destination. It will con-
struct packets that must contain a header, and 
optionally a payload, whereas both the header 
and payload need to be followed by a checksum 
of the bytes, for error detection purpose. The 
header of the packet contains information such 
as packet length, or sequence and acknowledge-
ment numbers. The payload of the packet is op-
tional, for example, the packet may be sent only 
to acknowledge and needn't contain one. The 
payload itself contains its own header, which 
features information such as message type, and 
may contain one or multiple sub-packets.
3.4. Control Module
The microcontroller is responsible for the sys-
tem operation, and ensures that everything 
goes smoothly. The control module is an ST-
M32L432 microcontroller which has all the re-
quired interfaces (UART, I2C) to communicate 
with the communication module, coprocessor, 
external nonvolatile memory and other inter-
faces. It performs authentication and encryp-
tion when and as needed, by communicating 
with the coprocessor. It follows the communi-
cation protocol and forms packets which it then 
orders the communication module to transmit, 
or receives packets from it, which it then decap-
sulates and processes. It is also responsible to 
start the systems operating and communicating. 
The microcontroller follows a sequence, from 
power up to communicating meaningful infor-
mation between devices. The sequence of the 
commands sent and received via the microcon-
troller to the user device and coprocessor are 
shown in Figure 2(a) and 2(b). The sequence of 
steps is as follows:
1. Initialize system and check with all the pe-
ripherals for their successful boot-up.
2. Initialize communication module: Start 
interfaces, perform configurations such as 
setting transmission power on wireless ra-
dios, or data packet size configurations.
3. Check wired and wireless interfaces for in-
coming connections.
Figure 1. System architecture.
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firmware. The proposed system allows in the 
core of the sensor interfacing hence, the data 
along the processing pathway can be kept more 
secure. Further, the authentication system is in 
the firmware of the control module, making it 
invisible or inaccessible to user.
The security systems studied and reviewed 
above require human intervention or are lim-
ited to a particular network, either Internet or 
WSN. The IoT not only connects computers but 
also connects smartphones with peripherals or 
sensors. The system should be capable of se-
curing any kind of platform such as Android, 
iOS, Windows; therefore, it has to be above the 
OS, at the application layer, while at the same 
time the authentication procedure should be au-
tomatic. If no human intervention is required, 
then the process is invisible and fast, which pro-
tects the system from several types of attacks. It 
should have a low overhead, as well as it should 
work with low-powered devices.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no oth-
er hardware system providing simultaneous 
multi-point security between a wide range of 
devices and technologies, and without human 
input. YubiKey for instance offers some vari-
ety in technologies (USB, NFC), however it is 
point to point and requires human input [14]. 
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and supports M2M, however it is exclusive to 
USB-C and also point to point [19]. Our pro-
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forms the authentication, controls the connec-
tivity, and builds an IoT based secured network, 
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only one device.
3. System Architecture
In this section, the system architecture of a de-
vice designed to facilitate secure connection of 
multiple types of devices in IoT setups is de-
scribed.
3.1. System overview
The proposed security system is composed of 
several modules. The main part is the security 
coprocessor module, which is a "coprocessor", 
that offers authentication and encryption. The 
system is also composed of a communication 
module, which enables the different systems 
to communicate with each other, while it fol-
lows the defined protocol. In addition, there is 
a control module that controls all modules and 
enables the system to function. It is responsible 
for the information exchanged, the protocol be-
ing followed, and performs authentication and 
encryption as required, by controlling the co-
processor.
Finally, a dedicated application is installed on 
the user device based on the platform such as 
iOS, Android or Windows. It performs the pro-
tocol specific steps with the security system. 
Figure 1 presents the architecture of the system.
For the purpose of clarifying, the practical im-
plementation of the system comprises the con-
trol module that is a microcontroller, the securi-
ty coprocessor module is simply a coprocessor, 
peripherals are devices whose data is to be se-
cured connected to microcontroller via I2C & 
UART such as sensors, and the communication 
module is Bluegiga Bluetooth chip. USB based 
user systems are wired user devices and wire-
less devices are the user smartphones including 
wireless sensors. For consistency purposes, the 
modules will be referred to with their specific 
names rather than the abstracted module names, 
unless necessary. The entire arrangement is 
termed as a security system that can connect to 
any device, node, or peripheral that needs data 
authentication and encryption features. It can 
be used in several use cases and configurations, 
such as authenticating peripherals for devices, 
devices for devices, or even devices for differ-
ent systems, on either one or both ends. If the 
system authenticating another system is trusted, 
then it may not be necessary to authenticate on 
both ends. In any case, an end to end encryption 
will be performed if necessary.
3.2. Coprocessor Module
The coprocessor found in the system can au-
thenticate and encrypt communications [21]. 
The authentication is performed in two steps. 
First, an X.509v3 certificate is sent to the au-
thenticating device from the coprocessor. The 
authenticating device can verify the certificate 
owner by checking the certificate, and verifying 
that the signer of the certificate is an entity that 
is trusted by both. This concludes the first step.
For the second step of the authentication, a ran-
domly generated challenge is submitted by the 
authenticating device. The challenge, together 
with a secret key known to both parties, under-
goes a hash-based message authentication code 
(HMAC) procedure, based on the SHA256 
hashing algorithm, which produces an irrevers-
ible response.
The combination of these two steps ensures the 
device or peripheral is secure and can be trust-
ed, as successful authentication may only be 
performed by the genuine device or peripheral 
that is connected through the security system. 
Following authentication, if the information ex-
changed between devices and peripherals needs 
to remain private, the coprocessor can addition-
ally encrypt it.
3.3. Communication Module
The communication module in the system can 
support various wired interfaces, e.g., Universal 
Serial Bus (USB) or Universal Asynchronous 
Receiver-Transmitter (UART), and wireless 
links, such as Bluetooth, between wireless de-
vices and control module. The communication 
module includes any hardware that is necessary 
for the communications, such as UART con-
trollers or Bluetooth radios, and extends into 
the control module. For the purpose of evalua-
tion, a wireless device with Bluetooth function-
ality (Bluegiga) was used in conjunction with 
the UART interface in the microcontroller. Typ-
ically, the security system will connect to one or 
more devices wirelessly and, on the other side, 
it connects with peripherals or sensors and for-
wards traffic between each other, by forming 
packets for the defined protocol, and does all 
the authentication and encryption.
The defined protocol mandates that commu-
nication may take place over any existing link 
that can send data in a raw form, be it in one or 
multiple packets, as long as all the data is pre-
served and reaches the destination. It will con-
struct packets that must contain a header, and 
optionally a payload, whereas both the header 
and payload need to be followed by a checksum 
of the bytes, for error detection purpose. The 
header of the packet contains information such 
as packet length, or sequence and acknowledge-
ment numbers. The payload of the packet is op-
tional, for example, the packet may be sent only 
to acknowledge and needn't contain one. The 
payload itself contains its own header, which 
features information such as message type, and 
may contain one or multiple sub-packets.
3.4. Control Module
The microcontroller is responsible for the sys-
tem operation, and ensures that everything 
goes smoothly. The control module is an ST-
M32L432 microcontroller which has all the re-
quired interfaces (UART, I2C) to communicate 
with the communication module, coprocessor, 
external nonvolatile memory and other inter-
faces. It performs authentication and encryp-
tion when and as needed, by communicating 
with the coprocessor. It follows the communi-
cation protocol and forms packets which it then 
orders the communication module to transmit, 
or receives packets from it, which it then decap-
sulates and processes. It is also responsible to 
start the systems operating and communicating. 
The microcontroller follows a sequence, from 
power up to communicating meaningful infor-
mation between devices. The sequence of the 
commands sent and received via the microcon-
troller to the user device and coprocessor are 
shown in Figure 2(a) and 2(b). The sequence of 
steps is as follows:
1. Initialize system and check with all the pe-
ripherals for their successful boot-up.
2. Initialize communication module: Start 
interfaces, perform configurations such as 
setting transmission power on wireless ra-
dios, or data packet size configurations.
3. Check wired and wireless interfaces for in-
coming connections.
Figure 1. System architecture.
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4. Advertise to allow new connections.
5. Connect to the available paired devices 
and peripherals.
6. Detect devices/peripheral types requiring 
authentication and those that need to au-
thenticate.
7. Initialize the protocol and configure it for 
the connected devices and peripherals.
8. Initialize authentication procedure.
9. Certificate exchange and validation.
10. Challenge exchange and response verifica-
tion.
11. Establish trusted connection.
12. Configure secure link and encryption if 
necessary.
13. Tabulate each connected device and pe-
ripheral status and characteristics.
14. Poll for data between connected user devic-
es and peripherals in multiplexing mode.
15. Generate packets for protocol and parame-
ters supported by each device.
16. Parse and decapsulate the incoming pack-
ets, and respond accordingly.
The security system acts as a gateway between 
the devices and the peripherals, therefore han-
dles the connections, packet formation and 
parsing. All the authentication validation and 
response generation and encryption of data are 
done by the coprocessor.
4. Security Coprocessor
The security coprocessor is a fairly complex 
module ‒ its structure, its components, and 
functionality regarding the incorporation in 
our board are outlined in this section. A more 
detailed architecture of the coprocessor design 
is contained in [21]. The coprocessor is imple-
mented in an ASIC, which is synthesized using 
the SIMC 65nm CMOS technology.
4.1. Coprocessor Overview
The coprocessor comprises two main sub-mod-
ules: the authentication and the encryption 
modules. The sub-modules may operate inde-
pendently or together, depending on the secu-
rity requirements of the communication. One 
sub-module performs the authentication in two 
steps, whereas the other sub-module performs 
encryption online as needed. The coprocessor 
is interfaced directly to the microcontroller and 
operates with command codes. An Inter-Inte-
grated Circuit (I2C) is used for communication 
between the two. The steps of interactions be-
tween the coprocessor and the microcontroller 
are shown in Figure 2(a), while the complete 
interactions of microcontroller with a remote 
mobile device are presented in Figure 2(b). Fur-
ther, Figure 3 shows a more detailed description 
of the coprocessor, which will also be described 
in the subsections below.
4.2. Authentication Sub-module
The authentication sub-module performs au-
thentication in two steps. The first step in-
volves an X.509v3 certificate, which is stored 
in a read-only memory. The certificate is sent 
to the authenticating device, where it is veri-
fied and validated. The authenticating device 
achieves validity by using the certification path 
validation algorithm specified in RFC 5280 
[22]. The algorithm requires that a certificate is 
signed by the authorities of higher trust, which 
is then trusted by both parties. Should that not 
be the case, there will be a certificate chain, 
where each certificate signs another, at the end 
of which an entity trusted by both parties will 
be present. In that case, the authenticated party 
will need to provide all the certificates leading 
up to the known and trusted one. By following 
the chain, the authenticating party can ensure 
that the certificate of the authenticated party is 
legitimate, and the device or peripheral is gen-
uine.
The second step involves the challenge/response 
exchange. A random, 64-bit long challenge, is 
generated by the authenticating party, and sent 
to the authenticated party where it is processed 
together with a 256-bit long secret key, also 
stored in the ROM. The secret key is known 
to both parties, and the procedure followed is 
HMAC-SHA256 that utilizes SHA256 which 
produces irreversible messages. The HMAC-
SHA256 procedure computes a 256-bit long 
response, which is transmitted to the authenti-
cating device. As the procedure is irreversible, 
the authenticating device has to compute the Figure 2. Protocol steps between microcontroller and (a) coprocessor (b) user devices.
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4. Advertise to allow new connections.
5. Connect to the available paired devices 
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the connected devices and peripherals.
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10. Challenge exchange and response verifica-
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12. Configure secure link and encryption if 
necessary.
13. Tabulate each connected device and pe-
ripheral status and characteristics.
14. Poll for data between connected user devic-
es and peripherals in multiplexing mode.
15. Generate packets for protocol and parame-
ters supported by each device.
16. Parse and decapsulate the incoming pack-
ets, and respond accordingly.
The security system acts as a gateway between 
the devices and the peripherals, therefore han-
dles the connections, packet formation and 
parsing. All the authentication validation and 
response generation and encryption of data are 
done by the coprocessor.
4. Security Coprocessor
The security coprocessor is a fairly complex 
module ‒ its structure, its components, and 
functionality regarding the incorporation in 
our board are outlined in this section. A more 
detailed architecture of the coprocessor design 
is contained in [21]. The coprocessor is imple-
mented in an ASIC, which is synthesized using 
the SIMC 65nm CMOS technology.
4.1. Coprocessor Overview
The coprocessor comprises two main sub-mod-
ules: the authentication and the encryption 
modules. The sub-modules may operate inde-
pendently or together, depending on the secu-
rity requirements of the communication. One 
sub-module performs the authentication in two 
steps, whereas the other sub-module performs 
encryption online as needed. The coprocessor 
is interfaced directly to the microcontroller and 
operates with command codes. An Inter-Inte-
grated Circuit (I2C) is used for communication 
between the two. The steps of interactions be-
tween the coprocessor and the microcontroller 
are shown in Figure 2(a), while the complete 
interactions of microcontroller with a remote 
mobile device are presented in Figure 2(b). Fur-
ther, Figure 3 shows a more detailed description 
of the coprocessor, which will also be described 
in the subsections below.
4.2. Authentication Sub-module
The authentication sub-module performs au-
thentication in two steps. The first step in-
volves an X.509v3 certificate, which is stored 
in a read-only memory. The certificate is sent 
to the authenticating device, where it is veri-
fied and validated. The authenticating device 
achieves validity by using the certification path 
validation algorithm specified in RFC 5280 
[22]. The algorithm requires that a certificate is 
signed by the authorities of higher trust, which 
is then trusted by both parties. Should that not 
be the case, there will be a certificate chain, 
where each certificate signs another, at the end 
of which an entity trusted by both parties will 
be present. In that case, the authenticated party 
will need to provide all the certificates leading 
up to the known and trusted one. By following 
the chain, the authenticating party can ensure 
that the certificate of the authenticated party is 
legitimate, and the device or peripheral is gen-
uine.
The second step involves the challenge/response 
exchange. A random, 64-bit long challenge, is 
generated by the authenticating party, and sent 
to the authenticated party where it is processed 
together with a 256-bit long secret key, also 
stored in the ROM. The secret key is known 
to both parties, and the procedure followed is 
HMAC-SHA256 that utilizes SHA256 which 
produces irreversible messages. The HMAC-
SHA256 procedure computes a 256-bit long 
response, which is transmitted to the authenti-
cating device. As the procedure is irreversible, 
the authenticating device has to compute the Figure 2. Protocol steps between microcontroller and (a) coprocessor (b) user devices.
242 243R. Singh Boparai et al. Multi-point Security by a Multiplatform-compatible Multifunctional Authentication and...
response as well, using the known secret key, 
then compare it to the received one [21]. If the 
two match, then the secret key is correct, while 
the hashed response ensures that the commu-
nication is immune to the "man in the middle" 
MITM attacks, and the secret key cannot be ex-
tracted. The random challenge generation also 
ensures that reproducing the response to a new 
challenge will not be correct, thus countering 
replay attacks.
4.3. Encryption Sub-module
The encryption sub-module utilizes Elliptic 
Curve Cryptography (ECC) that achieves re-
sults similar to older asymmetric key cryptog-
raphy methods using a shorter key size [23], 
[24], [25]. Using ECC as an alternative security 
approach was proposed decades ago, the reason 
being that popular approaches such as Rivest, 
Shamir, and Adelman (RSA) and Digital Sig-
nature Algorithm (DSA) rely on the integer fac-
torization and discrete logarithms, which might 
take sub-exponential time. As a result, to ensure 
that an encryption is sufficiently secure, an ev-
er-increasing key size is needed. Currently, the 
National Institute of Standards and Technol-
ogy (NIST) suggests the use of 1024-bit long 
keys [26], which are equivalent to 160-bit long 
keys when using ECC [27]. For resource-con-
strained devices and peripherals, this advantage 
is critical.
However, symmetric key cryptography is more 
efficient and fast, and for this reason, fast Ad-
vanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption 
ensues. Therefore, a combination of ECC and 
AES is utilized in the encryption. The procedure 
performed is as follows: at first, an ECC private 
key is dynamically generated and the equivalent 
public key is calculated and exchanged. Using 
the secure channel, a shared key is then generat-
ed and exchanged. Finally, with the shared key, 
fast encryption is performed and the communi-
cation is secured.
5. System Advantages and 
Applications
While the existing systems are mainly limited 
to Wi-Fi or wired access, the proposed module 
can connect via Bluetooth as well. The Blue-
tooth-based networks are less secure, especially 
for Android, so the system is capable of con-
necting sensors and Android devices using a 
secure protocol at the same time. Further, Blue-
tooth connections utilize a combination of Sim-
ple Secure Pairing (SSP) and LE Secure Con-
nections (LE SC) for pairing. Pairing by itself 
uses some form of encryption relying on ellip-
tic curves, however it has been recently proven 
that it is vulnerable to fixed coordinate invalid 
curve attacks [28]. Therefore, pairing by itself 
is not as secure, and, if intercepted, the com-
munication will be vulnerable to MITM attacks 
on certain devices. Further authentication can 
prevent this.
The microcontroller is aware of the device 
types (peripheral or user device), OS (Android, 
iOS, Windows) and of a link (wired or wire-
less). Consequently, communication channels 
are established to comply with the protocols, 
such as SPP for Bluetooth connectivity with 
Android, iAP2 for iOS based devices, or TCP/
IP followed by protocol-based communication 
for WiFi, File Transfer Protocol (FTP) or USB-
based user devices.
The coprocessor has the certificate and key 
which are permanently programmed by the 
manufacturer, therefore the chip has to be re-
placed if the key or certificate has to be changed 
and it is one of the advantages of having the 
authentication/encryption task outside the main 
microcontroller. The multipurpose smartphones 
always have dedicated processors for special 
tasks such as pedometer step count. The micro-
controller has to deal with interrupts and pe-
ripherals, Input/Output registers, buffers which 
require switching between tasks frequently, 
therefore the performance and processing is 
improved if the real time tasks are handled by 
coprocessors.
This system can find its use in many applica-
tions, including the securing of pico networks, 
and in poor coverage areas, such as the base-
ments or underground metros. In a hospital, a 
doctor can continuously monitor sensors placed 
over the patient's body from anywhere in the 
network over the secured link. Here the sensors 
send data to the security system which authen-
ticates and encrypts the data and forwards it to 
the user application on the doctor's smartphone. 
The data can only be accessed by the user who 
has the Protocol Specific Application which re-
sponds to the challenge and unique key.  Anoth-
er application of the security system is in under-
ground metros, where the satellite signals are 
extremely weak, therefore the security system 
with GPS sensor as peripheral can be placed 
where it can have line-of-sight with satellites 
while it extends the range by forwarding the 
data to designated user devices within the area 
over the wireless link.
6. The Implementation
To evaluate the system, an implementation 
where IoT sensors transmit data to user person-
al devices is demonstrated. All IoT based devic-
es require a wireless link to connect to the net-
work, but the sensors provide raw data which 
is required to be encapsulated. Along with it, 
the setup of a secured link is also a crucial part 
before the exchange of data. Therefore, imple-
mentation of the system involves sequential 
steps which are required to be followed before 
transmission of data from peripherals to the 
user devices.
The test was done using the Bluetooth technol-
ogy which does not implement security aspects 
that wireless networks do. The system acts as a 
bidirectional gateway between multiple nodes. 
It implements a star topology, and all the de-
vices follow the authentication protocol. The 
sensors or peripherals can be connected to the 
gateway via a wired or wireless link. The Blue-
tooth technology used in the system is the most 
compatible Bluetooth 2.1 + EDR, using the Sil-
icon Labs Bluegiga radio with a line of sight 
range of up to 1000 meters, the highest of all 
Bluetooth radios [29]. Furthermore, it is based 
on Enhanced Data Rate (EDR) mode that has a 
higher throughput, as a requirement for multi-
node systems.
The system is completely automatic ‒ once 
powered, it automatically connects and config-
ures itself with all available paired devices. The 
user needs to perform pairing between wireless 
user devices and security system for the first 
time and the security system stores the authen-
ticated devices into non-volatile auto-connect 
list, while wired devices need plugging in. 
Upon security system power up, it connects 
with each auto-connect listed device available 
within wireless range and the ones connected 
over wired link simultaneously, and performs 
authentication and encryption using the pro-
tocol procedure provided, with a dedicated 
protocol compatible application installed on 
user devices. The data from all the connected 
peripherals is sent to the user devices over the 
same link saving a huge bandwidth. The pack-
et headers and payload headers contain the in-
formation of the peripheral device from which 
the data is received. Addition or elimination of 
nodes does not affect other devices connected 
to the system. The devices receive notifications 
about the eliminated node and the fact that no 
more data will be exchanged, or the addition of 
a new node.
6.1. Connection Capabilities
The system can support 7 simultaneous wire-
less connections, and multiple master-slave 
based devices can be connected via UART and 
Figure 3. The security coprocessor.
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response as well, using the known secret key, 
then compare it to the received one [21]. If the 
two match, then the secret key is correct, while 
the hashed response ensures that the commu-
nication is immune to the "man in the middle" 
MITM attacks, and the secret key cannot be ex-
tracted. The random challenge generation also 
ensures that reproducing the response to a new 
challenge will not be correct, thus countering 
replay attacks.
4.3. Encryption Sub-module
The encryption sub-module utilizes Elliptic 
Curve Cryptography (ECC) that achieves re-
sults similar to older asymmetric key cryptog-
raphy methods using a shorter key size [23], 
[24], [25]. Using ECC as an alternative security 
approach was proposed decades ago, the reason 
being that popular approaches such as Rivest, 
Shamir, and Adelman (RSA) and Digital Sig-
nature Algorithm (DSA) rely on the integer fac-
torization and discrete logarithms, which might 
take sub-exponential time. As a result, to ensure 
that an encryption is sufficiently secure, an ev-
er-increasing key size is needed. Currently, the 
National Institute of Standards and Technol-
ogy (NIST) suggests the use of 1024-bit long 
keys [26], which are equivalent to 160-bit long 
keys when using ECC [27]. For resource-con-
strained devices and peripherals, this advantage 
is critical.
However, symmetric key cryptography is more 
efficient and fast, and for this reason, fast Ad-
vanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption 
ensues. Therefore, a combination of ECC and 
AES is utilized in the encryption. The procedure 
performed is as follows: at first, an ECC private 
key is dynamically generated and the equivalent 
public key is calculated and exchanged. Using 
the secure channel, a shared key is then generat-
ed and exchanged. Finally, with the shared key, 
fast encryption is performed and the communi-
cation is secured.
5. System Advantages and 
Applications
While the existing systems are mainly limited 
to Wi-Fi or wired access, the proposed module 
can connect via Bluetooth as well. The Blue-
tooth-based networks are less secure, especially 
for Android, so the system is capable of con-
necting sensors and Android devices using a 
secure protocol at the same time. Further, Blue-
tooth connections utilize a combination of Sim-
ple Secure Pairing (SSP) and LE Secure Con-
nections (LE SC) for pairing. Pairing by itself 
uses some form of encryption relying on ellip-
tic curves, however it has been recently proven 
that it is vulnerable to fixed coordinate invalid 
curve attacks [28]. Therefore, pairing by itself 
is not as secure, and, if intercepted, the com-
munication will be vulnerable to MITM attacks 
on certain devices. Further authentication can 
prevent this.
The microcontroller is aware of the device 
types (peripheral or user device), OS (Android, 
iOS, Windows) and of a link (wired or wire-
less). Consequently, communication channels 
are established to comply with the protocols, 
such as SPP for Bluetooth connectivity with 
Android, iAP2 for iOS based devices, or TCP/
IP followed by protocol-based communication 
for WiFi, File Transfer Protocol (FTP) or USB-
based user devices.
The coprocessor has the certificate and key 
which are permanently programmed by the 
manufacturer, therefore the chip has to be re-
placed if the key or certificate has to be changed 
and it is one of the advantages of having the 
authentication/encryption task outside the main 
microcontroller. The multipurpose smartphones 
always have dedicated processors for special 
tasks such as pedometer step count. The micro-
controller has to deal with interrupts and pe-
ripherals, Input/Output registers, buffers which 
require switching between tasks frequently, 
therefore the performance and processing is 
improved if the real time tasks are handled by 
coprocessors.
This system can find its use in many applica-
tions, including the securing of pico networks, 
and in poor coverage areas, such as the base-
ments or underground metros. In a hospital, a 
doctor can continuously monitor sensors placed 
over the patient's body from anywhere in the 
network over the secured link. Here the sensors 
send data to the security system which authen-
ticates and encrypts the data and forwards it to 
the user application on the doctor's smartphone. 
The data can only be accessed by the user who 
has the Protocol Specific Application which re-
sponds to the challenge and unique key.  Anoth-
er application of the security system is in under-
ground metros, where the satellite signals are 
extremely weak, therefore the security system 
with GPS sensor as peripheral can be placed 
where it can have line-of-sight with satellites 
while it extends the range by forwarding the 
data to designated user devices within the area 
over the wireless link.
6. The Implementation
To evaluate the system, an implementation 
where IoT sensors transmit data to user person-
al devices is demonstrated. All IoT based devic-
es require a wireless link to connect to the net-
work, but the sensors provide raw data which 
is required to be encapsulated. Along with it, 
the setup of a secured link is also a crucial part 
before the exchange of data. Therefore, imple-
mentation of the system involves sequential 
steps which are required to be followed before 
transmission of data from peripherals to the 
user devices.
The test was done using the Bluetooth technol-
ogy which does not implement security aspects 
that wireless networks do. The system acts as a 
bidirectional gateway between multiple nodes. 
It implements a star topology, and all the de-
vices follow the authentication protocol. The 
sensors or peripherals can be connected to the 
gateway via a wired or wireless link. The Blue-
tooth technology used in the system is the most 
compatible Bluetooth 2.1 + EDR, using the Sil-
icon Labs Bluegiga radio with a line of sight 
range of up to 1000 meters, the highest of all 
Bluetooth radios [29]. Furthermore, it is based 
on Enhanced Data Rate (EDR) mode that has a 
higher throughput, as a requirement for multi-
node systems.
The system is completely automatic ‒ once 
powered, it automatically connects and config-
ures itself with all available paired devices. The 
user needs to perform pairing between wireless 
user devices and security system for the first 
time and the security system stores the authen-
ticated devices into non-volatile auto-connect 
list, while wired devices need plugging in. 
Upon security system power up, it connects 
with each auto-connect listed device available 
within wireless range and the ones connected 
over wired link simultaneously, and performs 
authentication and encryption using the pro-
tocol procedure provided, with a dedicated 
protocol compatible application installed on 
user devices. The data from all the connected 
peripherals is sent to the user devices over the 
same link saving a huge bandwidth. The pack-
et headers and payload headers contain the in-
formation of the peripheral device from which 
the data is received. Addition or elimination of 
nodes does not affect other devices connected 
to the system. The devices receive notifications 
about the eliminated node and the fact that no 
more data will be exchanged, or the addition of 
a new node.
6.1. Connection Capabilities
The system can support 7 simultaneous wire-
less connections, and multiple master-slave 
based devices can be connected via UART and 
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I2C. As seen in Figure 4, a wired sensor was 
connected to the system using UART while the 
coprocessor and a non-volatile memory were 
connected via I2C multi-master/slave mode. 
The very first step when a new device connects 
is the exchange of a protocol signal packet as 
shown in Figure 2(b), first packet between mi-
crocontroller and user device. This packet de-
fines that both ends follow the same protocol, 
failing of which leads to termination of the con-
nection.
The protocol signal is sent by the microcontrol-
ler and is responded by the application installed 
on the user device. The acknowledgment by 
user device defines the availability of proto-
col dedicated application on the user device. It 
follows a configuration of all the channels, and 
negotiation of data-related requirements, which 
include protocol details, payload sizes, time-
outs, and cumulative acknowledgments. The 
configuration is exchanged between connected 
nodes, and feasible configurations are followed 
throughout the communication. Thereafter, the 
authentication procedure shown in Figure 2(a) 
is performed, in which certificate and chal-
lenge are exchanged. The user devices request 
challenges from the microcontroller and the 
microcontroller removes the protocol header 
and sends the payload to the coprocessor. In re-
sponse, the coprocessor generates the challenge 
by hashing a key, as explained previously. The 
response is encapsulated in the protocol pack-
et by the microcontroller and forwarded to the 
user device. The same procedure is followed for 
the certificate exchange between user device, 
microcontroller, and coprocessor. The flow of 
requests and responses is shown in Figures 2(a) 
and 2(b). The entire protocol procedure is re-
peated for each user device. The user device 
applications (Android/iOS) initiate the request 
while microcontroller responds to the request. 
The user application executes all the protocol 
steps as listed in Figure 2(b) under user device.
Upon correct acceptance of a certificate and a 
response to the challenge, the procedure initi-
ates data exchange mode. In this mode, poll-
ing of data between devices and peripherals is 
performed, along with inquiry of new incoming 
connections or disconnections. The data from 
the peripheral is encapsulated in the protocol 
payload and forwarded to the devices, while 
the devices either acknowledge each or multi-
ple packets, or send back data along with the 
acknowledgement. The data from devices is in 
protocol-derived packets, which are parsed and 
the relevant data is forwarded to peripherals.
The data sent over wireless link needs a suit-
able User Interface (UI) to display the data and 
a smartphone application based on the protocol 
running on the security system. The user de-
vices look for a Bluetooth Universally Unique 
Identifier (UUID) for the very sole purpose of 
connecting with the system. The user applica-
tions follow the same procedure as the system 
does and counter-reply the protocol packets 
from the system. The application allows the 
users to send the data to the system which can 
be used to configure the sensor or peripheral 
settings such as power mode, intervals etc. In 
the background, the application follows au-
thentication steps at first, and then initializes 
the encrypted data channel. The incoming pro-
tocol-based packets are acknowledged depend-
ing on the configurations. The UI of the devices 
displays the parsed data and also displays the 
source of the incoming data, as shown in Figure 
5. The security system is programmed to con-
nect with both Android and iOS-based devices 
using the same generic protocol; hence, it is a 
multiplatform-compatible system that connects 
to both platforms using a virtual serial port and 
the Serial Port Profile (SPP) of Bluetooth [30]. 
Furthermore, it supports connections with wire-
less sensors, which could possibly be near the 
range devices that have a short communication 
range, whose raw data is required to be secured. 
A multiplexing mode is required when there 
are multiple connections and there could be the 
possibility of passing commands to one device 
or configuring the Bluetooth module while the 
other device is exchanging a data stream. The 
multiplexing mode (MUX) can handle both 
commands and data in one mode. For the prop-
er distinction between data and connection re-
lated commands to Bluegiga Bluetooth Chip 
and further to the device that is currently dealt 
with, a special syntax is followed. The syntax is 
the same for both sending data over UART by 
the host, and receiving data from the iWRAP 
firmware [31]. The mode provides a distinction 
between packets to and from multiple devic-
es. The MUX frame encapsulates the proto-
col packet of the authentication system. After 
authentication, the procedure enters a polling 
loop and the loop runs infinitely, continuous-
ly forwarding data in both directions. Using 
multiplexing, multiple devices are secured by 
authenticating/encrypting separately and then 
sending data over the secured links.
6.2. Hardware
The circuit consists of sub-modules which in-
clude coprocessor, Bluegiga(BG) Bluetooth 
Module and user interface LEDs, buttons and 
Sensor interface via UART. The BG WT41u, 
which is a Bluetooth module, is connected to an 
STM32L432 microprocessor via UART.
The UART to USB debugger terminal RXs 
are connected to both TX and RX wires of the 
microcontroller for performance computation. 
The power pins of the BG module are connect-
ed to the power and ground as stated by the 
Bluegiga WT41u datasheet. The coprocessor 
whose architecture is explained in Section 4, is 
connected to the microcontroller via I2C pins 
along with an FRAM. The board, designed in 
Cadence Allegro PCB Editor, is shown in Fig-
ure 6.
Figure 4. Schematic of security system.
Figure 5. Android user interface.
Figure 6. Assembled PCB.
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6.3. Working Model and Experimental 
Results
The assembled project, with all the components 
and modules soldered on the PCB, were able to 
connect and authenticate the devices paired to 
the module. Two tests were conducted for per-
formance evaluation. In Test 1, one device and 
one wired sensor were used, while Test 2 was 
conducted using 2 Android and 2 iOS devices 
with one wireless SensorTag (in this case, it was 
implemented as an Android device that sends 
the unsecured data) and one wired sensor. Test 
1 uses normal mode, while Test 2 uses MUX 
enhanced algorithm which lets the user handle 
data and control simultaneously. All user de-
vices continuously accept and acknowledge in-
coming data. In the test, the complete states of 
the protocol were explored and the system was 
shown to work for days without failure.
The working model in Figure 7 demonstrates 
the transfer of the location data via the standard 
NMEA sequences. As one built-in feature of 
iOS is that the location data cannot be provided 
to the mobile device without the proper authen-
tication, as this demonstrated interoperability 
with iOS is readily included in our system. In 
contrast, the YubiKey device does not support 
the iOS operation due to the stated "incompati-
bility" by YubiKey.
In IoT applications, the sensor-based systems 
feature two characteristics; low power and la-
tency. The low power operation is achieved 
by putting the system to sleep when no data is 
being transmitted. The typical sensor update is 
received after 1 second from the location-based 
SensorTags, whereas high throughput is neces-
sary for the systems which require continuous 
monitoring in real-time, while low power con-
sumption is not a priority.
The project was tested for its performance in 
which the time taken was computed between 
every sensor data transmission packet by us-
ing a very precise Systick timer of the micro-
controller, and timer difference was sent to the 
Debug window via debug UART. The project 
is BR/EDR based, therefore the throughput is 
required to be very high. In Test 1, with MUX 
feature disabled, it was found that the time 
difference between each packet transmitted to 
BG was around 10 milliseconds, where packet 
sizes were from 40 to 90 bytes. For 3562 data 
bytes (28496 bits) it took 500 ms, bringing the 
throughput to 57 kbps. With 18 bytes per header, 
per packet, there are a total of 918 header bytes 
making a total packet of 4480 bytes (35840 
bits) giving 71 kbps throughput with a baud rate 
of 115200 bps, which is proven to be the high 
throughput of about 61.7% over the wireless 
link as compared to the wired link baud rate be-
tween microcontroller and Bluegiga Bluetooth 
chip. The throughput for certain time duration 
is encapsulated in Table 1. Test 2 computed the 
performance of the system with the multiple 
devices, the MUX was enabled which required 
different algorithm to handle UART communi-
cation. From the experiment, it was found that 
the time taken in updating each device in mul-
tiple device communication is increased by n 
times the time required for communication be-
tween the security system and one device while 
throughput decreases by n times for each device 
where n is the number of devices.
The Bluegiga Bluetooth module supports serial 
communication with devices, therefore it does 
time division multiplexing. Table 2 shows the 
computation of time taken and throughput for 
each device based on total 3596 data bytes, 
where each packet has 18 header bytes and 
along with it, 5 MUX bytes, which are only sent 
between microcontroller and Bluegiga. There-
fore, the MUX bytes are not sent over the wire-
less link. The complete header is of 1150 bytes, 
making the packets of 4496 bytes (35968 bits) 
excluding MUX bytes, make the throughput of 
the security system as high as 75.7 kbps that 
excludes MUX bytes. Table 2 is the actual per-
formance between the system and each device 
when implemented using MUX algorithm.
The test results were perfectly close to the nat-
ural number multiplier, since the average time 
is stable either for one device or for many de-
vices. Hence, there is no gain or loss of time 
between sending a packet to one device or to 
many devices by the microcontroller because 
each packet is independently sent by microcon-
troller, irrespective of the number of devices. 
The result of throughput for communication 
with one device in Test 2 is higher than in Test 
1 because the algorithms were different for both 
cases. Test 2 is based on MUX that implements 
dual DMA for Sensor/Peripheral and communi-
cation module, which makes the system perfor-
mance much faster and robust. 
The multiplexing also reduces the power con-
sumption by the factor of number of devices 
connected, since the same security system can 
secure multiple nodes using one microcon-
troller, one coprocessor and one wireless chip, 
whereas all other studied systems are point to 
point such as USB Type-C [19], where every 
device uses a separate system.
Further, the latency of the coprocessor sub 
modules was tested. The authentication module 
has a latency of 0.95 ms, that is the time it takes 
to retrieve the X.509v3 certificate and com-
pute the challenge response with the HMAC-
SHA256 procedure. The encryption module has 
a latency of 1.75 ms for the setup phase, that is 
the ECC key generation and AES key computa-
tion. Encryption by itself only takes 0.01 ms per 
packet, which is not very significant [21]. The 
coprocessor is active for only a tiny fraction of 
the total time, which can be in the hundreds of 
milliseconds. However, the communication be-
tween that and the microcontroller introduces 
overhead. As such, any time saved by outsourc-
ing the security operations to the coprocessor is 
lost to that overhead. It can be safely estimated 
that if the microcontroller alone were to handle 
the security operations, the difference would 
not be noticeable and the throughput would be 
unaffected.
While the system is secure by design, vulnera-
bilities can exist. For instance, there can exist 
non-secure communication between a wireless, 
or even a wired sensor and the microcontroller. 
If the physical control of the interface or sen-
sor is lost, the unsecured side of the communi-
cation can be then intercepted – it is assumed Figure 7. Working model.
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Table 2.  Throughput and time taken between system 
and each device for 4496 bytes.
Number of 
devices Time taken (ms)
Throughput of 
each device
1 475 75.7 kbps
2 931 38.6 kbps
3 1430 25.1 kbps
4 1806 19.9 kbps
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that physical control is guaranteed. The wired 
sensor is in general harder to break in, however 
it is still possible to gain access to the wired in-
terfaces within the system. The sensor could be 
accessed by an impersonating microcontroller, 
which could retrieve all raw sensor data should 
that be the case. This can be mitigated by using 
programmable sensors where the platform spe-
cific protocol application can be implemented. 
Finally, the security coprocessor found within 
the system could be attacked. While the co-
processor by design is using inherently secure 
algorithms, and features tamper evidence, it 
could still be attacked on a hardware level, with 
information extracted out of the chip, or worse, 
the secure algorithms could be compromised 
(i.e. SHA collision). For all intents and purpos-
es, the system can be considered secure but not 
virtually impenetrable.
7. Conclusion and Future Work
An authentication and encryption board was de-
signed in such way that it extends and surpasses 
the security authentication scheme present for 
iOS devices to Android and other computing 
systems. The board can be used in a variety of 
scenarios to facilitate secure access to the com-
mon computing platforms and wired/wireless 
peripherals. The system is energy-efficient, be-
cause of the simultaneous securing ot the access 
between different devices. It is unique in that 
it provides multi-point functionality, in other 
words it can secure multiple communications 
without requiring a separate module for each 
communication channel, which also reduces 
the cost. The system has high throughput along 
with high-security level protection and can be 
implemented in the new or already existing sys-
tem. Since iOS secures the access at OS level, 
which is proprietary, the proposed scheme can 
be used at an application level with all the de-
vices, but due to the open-source nature of An-
droid, the authentication hardware provisions, 
and even the encryption support could be easily 
incorporated at OS level.
The present-day industries still have a lot of 
wired sensors and peripherals (via the existing 
UART, SPI, or I2C interfaces) in which the sys-
tem can be integrated to fetch the readings over 
the secured wireless link and even send com-
mands back to them. An addition such as cloud 
upload via one of the connected Bluetooth de-
vices can serve the further IoT purpose. The de-
sign can also be extended further to low-power 
systems that require high throughput, including 
the real-time systems.
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that physical control is guaranteed. The wired 
sensor is in general harder to break in, however 
it is still possible to gain access to the wired in-
terfaces within the system. The sensor could be 
accessed by an impersonating microcontroller, 
which could retrieve all raw sensor data should 
that be the case. This can be mitigated by using 
programmable sensors where the platform spe-
cific protocol application can be implemented. 
Finally, the security coprocessor found within 
the system could be attacked. While the co-
processor by design is using inherently secure 
algorithms, and features tamper evidence, it 
could still be attacked on a hardware level, with 
information extracted out of the chip, or worse, 
the secure algorithms could be compromised 
(i.e. SHA collision). For all intents and purpos-
es, the system can be considered secure but not 
virtually impenetrable.
7. Conclusion and Future Work
An authentication and encryption board was de-
signed in such way that it extends and surpasses 
the security authentication scheme present for 
iOS devices to Android and other computing 
systems. The board can be used in a variety of 
scenarios to facilitate secure access to the com-
mon computing platforms and wired/wireless 
peripherals. The system is energy-efficient, be-
cause of the simultaneous securing ot the access 
between different devices. It is unique in that 
it provides multi-point functionality, in other 
words it can secure multiple communications 
without requiring a separate module for each 
communication channel, which also reduces 
the cost. The system has high throughput along 
with high-security level protection and can be 
implemented in the new or already existing sys-
tem. Since iOS secures the access at OS level, 
which is proprietary, the proposed scheme can 
be used at an application level with all the de-
vices, but due to the open-source nature of An-
droid, the authentication hardware provisions, 
and even the encryption support could be easily 
incorporated at OS level.
The present-day industries still have a lot of 
wired sensors and peripherals (via the existing 
UART, SPI, or I2C interfaces) in which the sys-
tem can be integrated to fetch the readings over 
the secured wireless link and even send com-
mands back to them. An addition such as cloud 
upload via one of the connected Bluetooth de-
vices can serve the further IoT purpose. The de-
sign can also be extended further to low-power 
systems that require high throughput, including 
the real-time systems.
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